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13.1    Introduction
The projected gap between Medicare revenues and expenditures has grow-
ing immediacy with the implementation of the Part D drug beneﬁ  t and the 
looming bankruptcy of the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, which is used 
to make Medicare Part A payments. However, concerns about the sustain-
ability of Medicare are not new, and over the past twenty-  ﬁ  ve years several 
important legislative initiatives to control the growth in Medicare spending 
have been passed into law. The adoption of Medicare’s Prospective Payment 
System in the 1980s, for example, not only transformed the hospital care of 
Medicare patients, but inﬂ  uenced hospital reimbursement by private payers 
as well. Among the most far-  reaching legislative initiatives since then was 
the passage of the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997.
Most of the changes in the BBA were intended to cut reimbursements 
rather than to change mechanisms of payment, but they were more than 
minor modiﬁ  cations of existing payment policies. The changes included 
direct reductions to the Prospective Payment System (PPS) inpatient hos-
pital annual operating update and PPS inpatient capital payments, aﬀect-
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ing nearly all hospitals that cared for Medicare inpatients. Cuts in indirect 
medical education (IME) payments and direct medical education (DME) 
payments were felt by teaching institutions, while changes in formulas for 
disproportionate share (DSH) payments had their greatest eﬀects on hospi-
tals that cared for the indigent and uninsured. The BBA also expanded the 
Medicare transfer policy (which reduces payments for transfers of short-
  term acute patients in ten Diagnosis Related Groups who were discharged 
to a Skilled Nursing Facility, PPS-  exempt facilities, or to a home health 
agency). There were also changes in the structure of payment, such as the 
implementation of prospective payment systems for outpatient hospital, 
skilled nursing facilities, and home health agencies, and the creation of 
Medicare   Choice managed care plans, with eﬀorts to improve geographic 
adjustments to payments for such plans.
Although not all the BBA features were implemented immediately, and its 
provisions were modiﬁ  ed—and in some cases, weakened—in the Balanced 
Budget Reﬁ  nement Act (BBRA) of 1999, its eﬀects were felt by hospitals 
and other providers. Reportedly hospital margins shrunk, and home health 
service used dropped dramatically, with a large reduction in the number of 
home health service providers (Wilensky 2000).
The BBA eﬀects on hospitals may be diﬃcult to assess fully because there 
were contemporaneous changes in payments from private insurers, many 
working in the same direction. We seek here to investigate how BBA may 
have aﬀected trends in Medicare expenditures for beneﬁ  ciaries. At least in 
the immediate post-  BBA period, the most important eﬀects were on inpa-
tient services and home health services, where the intention was unambigu-
ously to reduce Medicare payments. Other features, such as the introduction 
of prospective payment for some outpatient services and the creation of 
Medicare   Choice plans, were clearly intended to provide new payment 
mechanisms with the prospect for long-  term expenditure control, but were 
not necessarily designed to reduce near-  term expenditures.
Our interest focuses on the eﬀects of BBA on the dispersion of Medicare 
expenditures. That is, we seek to learn whether following the implementa-
tion of the BBA expenditures grew more or less rapidly for high- expenditure 
Medicare beneﬁ  ciaries than for people who used few Medicare- covered ser-
vices. The growth in per-  beneﬁ  ciary expenditures slowed after implementa-
tion of the BBA but its eﬀects on the dispersion of expenditures have been 
little studied. In particular, did the BBA selectively reduce cost growth at the 
high end, where many of its features were directed? Did growth slow evenly 
among all Medicare beneﬁ  ciaries? And were the eﬀects diﬀerent for men 
and women, or blacks and whites? The changes in disproportionate share 
payments, for example, would have been felt predominantly by hospitals 
providing care for the poor, and thus might have led to greater changes in 
expenditures for blacks than whites.
We describe changes in cohort patterns of expenditures between 1997 and The Narrowing Dispersion of Medicare Expenditures 1997 to 2005    3 8 9
2005, describing growth in per capita expenditures at diﬀerent percentiles 
for diﬀerent subgroups.
13.2    Data  and  Methods
Our primary data source is the Medicare Beneﬁ  ciary Annual Summary 
File (BASF). The BASF is a data set that contains comprehensive informa-
tion on Medicare expenditures for 100 percent of all Medicare enrollees 
who are not enrolled in a Medicare Advantage (HMO) plan. Expenditures 
include all sources of Medicare expenditures, including Part A, Part B, phy-
sician expenditures, home health expenditures, and skilled nursing facilities 
(thought not Part D, since it was not implemented until 2006). The BASF 
also includes a comprehensive set of chronic disease indicators for each 
individual in the ﬁ  le. No individual leaves our sample until death.
13.2.1      Description of the Data
The BASF data are derived from annual enrollment and claims data col-
lected by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). These are 
administrative data used by CMS to verify eligibility and to process hospi-
tal and physician claims for payment on behalf of Medicare beneﬁ  ciaries. 
Enrollment data capture eligibility and demographic information at a point-
  in-  time (typically July 1st of each calendar year). Claims data are requests 
for payment for a particular service provided during a given period of time, 
and they include information on the ICD-  9-  CM diagnosis and procedure 
codes, CPT-  4/  HCPCS codes, revenue center codes, provider type/  specialty, 
Medicare reimbursement, third-  party payments, beneﬁ  ciary copayments, 
and deductibles. Claim formats vary depending on the type of provider and 
whether the claims were processed by a ﬁ  scal intermediary (hospital insur-
ance under Part A) or a carrier (supplemental medical insurance under Part 
B). Only those beneﬁ  ciaries enrolled in Medicare fee-  for-  service generate 
claims data.
Claims data in raw format are not useful for analyses of beneﬁ  ciary utili-
zation and expenditures over time because such an analysis requires aggre-
gating enrollment, service use, program payments, and beneﬁ  ciary payments 
across claims, service types, and dates of service. Information on diagnoses 
and procedures need to be summarized for analyses of beneﬁ  ciaries with 
particular conditions and treatments. Enrollment data capturing point-  in-
  time status must be validated and made consistent to reﬂ  ect continuous 
enrollment status in Medicare fee-  for-  service and managed care.
To convert these data into a format useful for conducting analyses of 
beneﬁ  ciary utilization and expenditures over time, we created utilization 
and expenditure ﬁ  les that summarize data on all nonmanaged care Medi-
care beneﬁ  ciaries in each year between 1997 and 2005 inclusive. These data 
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enrollment and mortality using date of death information from linked Social 
Security records. These data also contain utilization and expenditure data 
by service type, including inpatient hospital, skilled nursing facility (SNF), 
home health agency, hospice, outpatient hospital, physician (including clini-
cal lab), and durable medical equipment. Expenditure data include Medi-
care program payments, third-  party payments, and beneﬁ  ciary payments 
(copayments and deductibles), with indicators supplied signaling assigned 
diagnosis-  related group (DRG) (for inpatient hospital and SNF) or princi-
pal diagnosis (home health, outpatient hospital, and physician). In this 
chapter, we focus our attention on total Medicare expenditures per capita, 
which is a sum of expenditures from all these categories over the whole year.
13.2.2    Chronic  Disease  Indicators
For some of our analyses, we need detailed information on the health 
status of Medicare patients. Rather than rely on self- reports, we instead use 
diagnostic code data in claims records to generate objective information on 
the presence of chronic disease. This information is derived from looking at 
patterns of longitudinally- linked claims records for a single individual. The 
basic idea in deriving chronic condition indicators is that if an individual has 
a past claim with the diagnosis listed, then that individual can be presumed 
to have that chronic condition. The procedures associated with implement-
ing this basic idea obviously involve a lot of attention to detail, however.
For the purpose of creating risk adjustment scores for payment to man-
aged care programs, CMS has endorsed a methodology for assigning chronic 
disease indicators (called hierarchical conditional categories, or HCCs). We 
adopt this methodology to develop chronic disease indicators here. Pope 
et al. (2004) describe this methodology in some detail; we refer interested 
readers there, focusing here on only a few important details.
To assign HCCs for a Medicare enrollee in 1997, we examine diagnostic 
codes in Medicare claims in the prior two years. Once an enrollee is assigned 
a chronic disease indicator, that same enrollee is recorded with the same indi-
cator in subsequent years. The list of conditions is derived from a longer and 
more detailed list of chronic conditions called CCs, which is itself derivative 
of the well-  known ICD-  9 coding system.
Clearly, this method of assigning chronic disease indicators is imper-
fect. Biases can arise from many diﬀerent sources. In the 1970s, when large 
administrative data sets recording hospital claims data for patient discharges 
ﬁ  rst became available, it was natural for researchers to want to use them to 
estimate some outcomes of interest, such as mortality rates associated with 
particular diseases. However, distrust of coding accuracy, given empirical 
backing by a series of inﬂ  uential studies by the Institute of Medicine (1977a, 
1977b, 1980), likely played a role in discouraging investigators from using 
these data sets in such a manner. One of these studies (Institute of Medicine 
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diagnosis listed in the data set agreed with a controlled, expert reabstraction 
of the medical chart only an average of 73.2 percent of the time. Qualita-
tively similar results were found for Medicare claims data.
With the introduction of the prospective payment system and DRG reim-
bursement for Medicare claims, the additional concern arose that hospitals 
might game the reporting of patient diagnosis in order to increase payment 
for cases. Hsia et al. (1988) found that for a sample of 7,050 Medicare case 
records from 239 hospitals, the reabstracted diagnosis disagreed with that 
in the data set 20.8 percent of the time. Of these discrepancies, a statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant 61.7 percent favored the hospital ﬁ  nancially. Additionally, 
  Iezzoni et al. (1988) found that for a set of records from ﬁ  fteen Boston hos-
pitals, cases that presented as potential acute myocardial infarction (AMI) 
were commonly recorded as AMI even if further investigation revealed some 
other disease process. This was especially common for tertiary care teaching 
hospitals.
Recent scholarship has been cautiously optimistic about the improving 
quality of the Medicare administrative database diagnostic information. 
For example, another case record reabstraction study conducted by Fisher 
et al. (1992) explicitly attempted to replicate the Institute of Medicine study 
with the 1985 Medicare claims database. They found that the accuracy had 
modestly improved by 5 percentage points, relative to the earlier study.
While reabstraction studies have generally found diagnostic discrepancies 
on the order of 20 percent or more, the Medicare data set has performed 
better when other approaches are used to verify its external validity. Using 
Medicare claims and enrollment data from 1983 to 1986, Whittle et al. 
(1991a) estimated the incidence rate of breast, lung, and colon cancer and 
the rate of their surgical resection among the elderly population. They com-
pared these estimates to those derived independently using a diﬀerent survey 
instrument by the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology, 
and End Results (SEER) program. The SEER data come from nine regional 
registries, accounting for 10 percent of the U.S. population. They found 
that the Medicare incidence rates were within 6 percent of SEER estimates, 
but that Medicare resection rates were 12 percent to 27 percent lower than 
SEER rates. One possible explanation for the discrepancy in resection rates 
is that practice patterns outside of SEER regions diﬀer from those inside. 
However, they found that the Medicare resection estimates within SEER 
regions are not statistically diﬀerent from those outside SEER regions for 
lung and colon cancer.
McBean, Babish, and Warren (1993) also estimated lung cancer incidence 
from Medicare data and compared the result to SEER estimates for the 
years 1986 to 1987. With the assumption that SEER estimates have no sam-
pling variance, they found that SEER identiﬁ  ed a statistically signiﬁ  cant 
5.9 percent more cases than did Medicare. However, the population inci-
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264.7/  100,000 for the Medicare data. In contrast to Whittle et al. (1991a) 
they found that age-  adjusted cancer incidence rates calculated using Medi-
care data were about 10 percent higher for patients residing outside SEER 
regions than inside.
In a more comprehensive study, McBean, Warren, and Babish (1994) 
repeated their previous work for the years 1986 to 1990, and for six diﬀerent 
cancers. For breast, colon, lung cancer, and corpus uteri, they found that 
SEER and Medicare data estimates diﬀered by less than 5 percent, while 
they diﬀered by less than 8 percent for prostate and esophagus cancer. They 
found no uniform pattern in the diﬀerences between incidence rates inside 
and outside SEER regions. They concluded that Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) data should be used to augment SEER monitoring 
of cancer incidence.
One potential explanation for the diﬀerent conclusions reached by the 
reabstraction studies and the SEER studies is that while case abstracters 
may have trouble replicably assigning a very speciﬁ  c code, they have little 
problem assigning a broad diagnosis, like lung cancer. Hospitals are also 
less likely to misreport broad diagnostic designations for ﬁ  nancial gain be-
cause the likelihood of detection by review agencies is higher than when ﬁ  ne 
diagnostic distinctions are misrepresented. If this is indeed the case, then 
studies using Medicare administrative databases to track broad diagnostic 
categories, such as HCCs, are more plausible than those that make use of 
ﬁ  ner diagnostic information.
These concerns aside, a large number of articles use Medicare Part A 
administrative data to estimate various epidemiological quantities of inter-
est. Among such applications include estimates of: mortality rates after 
radical prostatectomy for prostate cancer patients (Mark 1994); in-  hospital 
mortality after a stroke (May and Kittner 1994); resection rates and associ-
ated long-  term mortality rates for colon cancer (Whittle et al. 1992) and 
lung cancer (Whittle et al. 1991b); post-  myocardial infarction (MI) mortal-
ity rates, reinfarction rates, and likelihood of undergoing coronary artery 
bypass grafting (CABG) and/ or percutaneous transluminal coronary an gio-
plasty (PTCA) (Udvarhelyi et al. 1992); and structural shifts in the mortality 
rates associated with CABG and PTCA over time (Peterson et al. 1994). 
Finally, this data set has been popular in the health services literature as 
well for myriad uses such as the estimation of regional variation in read-
mission rates for various diseases (Fisher et al. 1994) among many other 
applications. It is necessarily beyond the scope of this chapter to review all 
of these papers.
13.2.3    Methods
In this chapter, we track changes in the distribution of Medicare expen-
ditures over the period 1997 to 2005. Program payments are funds paid by 
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third-  party payments, in addition to beneﬁ  ciary copayments and deduct-
ibles. Hereafter, we will refer to the sum of program payments and expen-
ditures as simply expenditures. Among the statistics we track, we include 
mean expenditures as well as ﬁ  rst, ﬁ  fth, tenth, twenty- ﬁ  fth, ﬁ  ftieth, ninetieth, 
ninety- ﬁ  fth, and ninety-  ninth percentiles. We examine trends in the distri-
bution of expenditures for diﬀerent demographic and clinical subgroups of 
patients. To conduct these subgroup analyses, we ﬁ  rst select all Medicare 
enrollees in each year that are members of the subgroup and then calculate 
summary statistics on expenditures for those members. We report changes in 
these summary statistics in two ways: absolute changes in real expenditures 
over the 1997 to 2005 period and per annum growth rates in expenditures. 
All results are reported in constant 2005 dollars.
In addition to trends in these summary statistics, we develop smoothed 
estimates of how the distribution of Medicare expenditures has changed 
over time. To track changes in mean expenditures, we estimate ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression equations in which expenditures are a smooth 
function of the age of the respondent and the year of the observation. To 
track changes in the percentiles, we estimate quantile regressions (see Koen-
ker and Hallock 2001) in which the key dependent variables are also smooth 
functions of age and year. In the remainder of this section, we make clear 
what we mean by “smooth functions.” In this discussion, we will focus on 
how mean expenditure changes, but the smoothing method we use applies 
just as well in the quantile regression setting.
Constructing age-  speciﬁ  c proﬁ  les of costs invariably runs into a problem 
of sample size. Even in a large, nationally representative sample such as the 
Medicare Current Beneﬁ  ciary Survey (MCBS), the sample size at a single 
age turns out to be quite small to construct reliable estimates, especially for 
some of the smaller subgroup analyses that we conduct. To address this 
problem, we rely on the idea that Medicare expenditures should change 
smoothly across ages.
To describe the method we use to produce smooth age- speciﬁ  c prevalence 
functions—the overlap polynomial method1—it is helpful to introduce some 
notation. Each observation i, taken in yeari, consists of information about 
i’s Medicare expenditures expendi and agei.2 Given these data, we estimate 
the following model of Medicare expenditures:
(1) expendi   c   g1 (agei,  1)   g2 (yeari,  1).
The g functions allow Medicare expenditures to ﬂ  exibly vary with the year 
of observation and the age- cohort of the respondent. Age- cohort enters the 
model through g1, which is speciﬁ  ed using an overlap polynomial:
1. See MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990); MaCurdy and Garber (1993); and Bhattacha-
rya, Garber, and MaCurdy (1997).
2. It is possible to adapt this method to use other covariates.394        Jay Bhattacharya, Alan M. Garber, and Thomas MaCurdy
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where pj(agei;  1j) j   0, . . . , K   1 are all nth- order polynomial in agei. The 
knots are k0 . . . kK 1, and  1 is a smoothing parameter, which in addition to 
n, are all ﬁ  xed before estimation. We use ﬁ  rst-  degree polynomials. Though 
we experimented with higher- order polynomials, we ﬁ  nd that they add to the 
costs of computation with no change in the ﬁ  nal projections.
With this smoothing technique, the knots deﬁ  ne age intervals. When the 
smoothing parameter approaches zero, the age proﬁ  le over each interval 
simply equals the within-  interval average expenditures. In this case, the age 
proﬁ  le reduces to a step function, where each step equals the within- interval 
average disability.3 As the smoothing parameter increases, the estimator uses 
increasingly more information from outside each interval. In the extreme, as 
the smoothing parameter approaches inﬁ  nity, there is no meaningful distinc-
tion between any two intervals. Allowing nonzero values of the smoothing 
parameters eliminates the sharp discontinuity of the growth rates at the 
knots. One advantage of overlapping polynomials over traditional splines 
is that the function and all its derivatives are automatically continuous at 
the knots without imposing any parameter restrictions.
In addition to an overlap polynomial for age, we also include another 
overlap polynomial, g2, for year to ﬂ  exibly allow for changes in the age-
  prevalence relationship over time. Here, the knots are mj, j   0, . . . , M, the 
smoothing constant is  2, and qj are the polynomials. As before, experimen-
tation led us to use ﬁ  rst-  order polynomials in year.


























The object of the estimation is to obtain consistent estimates for  1 and 
 2 –   ˆ
1 and   ˆ
2, respectively. Using these estimates, it is straightforward to gen-
erate age- speciﬁ  c expenditure proﬁ  les representative for any particular year. 
Let  t,a be the predicted expenditures among a-  year olds in year t. Then,





[c ˆ   g1(agei,   ˆ
1)   g2(yeari,   ˆ
2)].
In some speciﬁ  cations, we are interested in how cohort proﬁ  les in Medicare 
expenditures have changed over time. For these speciﬁ  cations, we include 
interaction terms like:
3. When this is the case,  (.) reduces to an indicator function equal to zero if age   kj and 
one if age   kj. Thus, the ﬁ  rst term of the sum, ( ((agei –   k1)/   1) –     ((agei –   k0)/   1))p0, equals 
p0 when k0   age   k1, and zero otherwise. Between k0 and k1, the rate of disability is given by 
p0, which in turn depends on the parameters  1,0.The Narrowing Dispersion of Medicare Expenditures 1997 to 2005    3 9 5




















































Including terms like this is necessary because a speciﬁ  cation like (1) imposes 
that cohort trends in expenditures are all parallel to each other. However, 
because age, cohort, and year are linearly related, it is not possible to esti-
mate a full set of interaction terms. MaCurdy and Garber (1993) provide 
details on what restrictions are necessary and on how to recover cohort 
trends from speciﬁ  cations like the one shown previously.
13.3    Results
Table 13.1 shows how per capita expenditures on Medicare patients grew 
over the period 1997 to 2005. The BASF data conﬁ  rm the ﬁ  nding from other 
data sources that per capita Medicare expenditures grew at 4.29 percent per 
annum over this period (see Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla 2006). Since all 
these ﬁ  gures are adjusted for inﬂ  ation with the standard consumer price 
index, this represents a real growth in Medicare expenditures. This mean 
growth rate, however, hides important facts in the evolution of Medicare 
expenditures.
One of these facts, evident in table 13.1, is that the upper tail of the expen-
diture distribution actually shifted left between 1997 and 2000. The ninetieth 
percentile of the expenditure distribution decreased from $15,348 in 1997 
to $15,011 in 2000; the ninety-  ﬁ  fth percentile decreased from $27,218 to 
$26,556; and the ninety- ninth percentile decreased from $59,325 to $58,215. 
Even mean expenditures declined between 1997 and 1999. Presumably these 
declines can be attributed to the eﬀects of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act 
(BBA). The declines were short- lived, though. The expenditure distribution 
started shifting to the right in 2000 (after passage of the BBRA) and contin-
ued to do so in every percentile and in every year through 2005.
Despite the decline between 1997 and 2000, there has been growth in per 
capita Medicare expenditures across the whole distribution of expenditures 
(save the left tail) between 1997 and 2005. For instance, median per capita 
expenditures grew by $842; the ninetieth percentile grew by $5,821; and the 
ninety-  ninth percentile grew by $74,808. Looking at these absolute dollar 
increases alone, it would appear that there were larger increases at the upper 
end of the distribution than there were at the lower end. But as a propor-
tion of initial 1997 expenditures for each percentile, the upper end of the 
distribution actually grew more slowly than the lower end. For instance, the 
median grew at 10.06 percent per annum while the ninetieth and ninety-
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expenditures more than doubled over the 1997 to 2005 period. This was not 
the case for the upper percentiles.
The implications of these changes are that the Medicare per- capita expen-
diture distribution shifted to the right and that relative diﬀerences in expen-
ditures between the lowest and highest parts of the distribution (leaving 
aside zeroes in the lowest percentiles) shrank. The fastest growth occurred 
in the middle of the distribution, while the upper end grew only modestly. 
This updates the trend reported by MaCurdy and Geppert (2005) for years 
prior to 1997. In one sense, inequality in Medicare expenditures has been 
declining: the distribution of per capita Medicare expenditures, conditional 
on having some expenditures at all, has been narrowing since 1997.
In another sense, inequality has been rising. Diﬀerences between expen-
ditures for the care of black and white Medicare beneﬁ  ciaries inequality has 
been increasing. Table 13.2, shows changes between 1997 and 2005 in the 
distribution of Medicare expenditures separately for black and white males 
and black and white females. For white males and white females, the real per 
annum mean growth rate in Medicare expenditures was 4.13 percent and 4.55 
percent. By contrast, the analogous growth rates for black males and black 
females were 3.59 percent and 3.31 percent per annum. For whites, conditional 
on spending something, there was growth throughout the expenditure distri-
bution. Given the results we report in table 13.1, it is unsurprising that the 
Table 13.2  Medicare expenditure, by sex and race
White Black Other race














p1 $0 0.00 $0 0.00 $0 0.00
p5 $0 0.00 $0 0.00 $0 0.00
p10 $0 0.00 $0 0.00 $0 0.00
p50 $785 9.93 $519 9.98 $416 11.42
p90 $5,721 4.00 $6,252 3.42 $5,236 4.82
p95 $8,526 3.41 $10,544 3.32 $8,631 3.79
p99 $16,225 3.05 $23,402 3.30 $18,148 3.16
Mean $1,997 4.13 $2,135 3.59 $1,823 4.40
B Females
p1 $0 0.00 $0 0.00 $0 0.00
p5 $0 0.00 $0 0.00 $0 0.00
p10 $39 n.a. $0 0.00 $0 0.00
p50 $943 10.30 $840 9.48 $625 10.26
p90 $5,992 4.34 $5,315 2.77 $5,473 5.06
p95 $8,702 3.70 $8,570 2.66 $8,258 3.78
p99 $13,916 2.84 $19,199 2.75 $15,731 2.94
Mean   $2,124   4.55   $2,089   3.31   $1,932   4.65398        Jay Bhattacharya, Alan M. Garber, and Thomas MaCurdy
fastest growth for blacks and whites occurred at the middle of their respective 
distributions (about 10 percent per annum for whites and 9.5 to 10.3 percent 
per annum for blacks at the median). Growth was slower at the upper tails for 
everyone, though less in general for blacks than whites. To summarize, Medi-
care expenditure diﬀerences between blacks and whites grew over this period 
while the distribution of Medicare expenditures narrowed for each group.
Table 13.3 charts the increase in expenditures for men and women in 
diﬀerent age groups rather than of diﬀerent races. The most striking result 
in table 13.3 is that ninety-  ﬁ   ve- to  ninety- nine- year- olds—both  men  and 
women—had the large increases in mean Medicare expenditures relative to 
younger Medicare populations between 1997 and 2005. For men, sixty-  ﬁ  ve 
to sixty- nine- year- olds had the smallest increase at the mean—3.67 percent-
age points per annum. For women, eighty-  ﬁ   ve  to  eighty- nine- year- olds  had 
the smallest increase at the mean—3.84 percent per annum. For all age-
  sex groups, the biggest proportionate increases in Medicare expenditures 
occurred in the lower end of the distribution (conditional on any expendi-
tures). Indeed, eighty-  ﬁ  ve to eighty-  nine-  year-  old men had an increase of 
31.6 percent at the tenth percentile. Similarly, seventy-   to seventy-  four and 
ninety- ﬁ  ve to ninety-  nine-  year-  old women and ninety-   to ninety-  four-  year-
  old men at the tenth percentile spent nothing in 1997 but spent positive 
amounts in 2005.
Table 13.4 oﬀers another perspective on the relationship between aging 
and per capita Medicare expenditures. We organize the data by cohort of 
birth (rather than by age), and we follow the expenditure distributions of 
three cohorts between 1997 and 2005. For the oldest cohort we examine 
(born in 1912), mean and median expenditures increased by 7.5 percent and 
3.9 percent per annum, which was less than the analogous increases for the 
1922 and 1932 birth cohorts. The sharpest increases occurred for the young-
est (born in 1932) cohort’s expenditure distribution. Its median expenditures 
went up by 10.9 percent per annum.
Figures 13.1 and 13.2 organize these data visually using the smoothing 
technology that we describe in the methods section. In these ﬁ  gures, we plot 
both the age-  expenditure proﬁ  le in 2001 and the cohort-  speciﬁ  c trends for 
the 1912, 1922, and 1932 cohorts in each year between 1997 and 2005. Fig-
ure 13.1 plots these objects at the ninetieth, ninety-  ﬁ  fth, and ninety-  ninth 
percentiles, while ﬁ  gure 13.2 plots them at the mean and median. In each 
case, the cohort proﬁ  les are steeper than the age-  expenditure proﬁ  les. For 
instance, the ninety-  ninth percentile of expenditures for seventy-  nine-  year-
  olds in 2001 was less than the ninety-  ninth percentile for seventy-  nine- 
year-  olds in 2002. It is evident from these ﬁ  gures and from table 13.4 that 
the youngest cohorts experienced the sharpest growth in Medicare expen-
ditures.
The fact that the population of the oldest old experienced the smallest 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5Fig. 13.1    Smoothed annual Medicare expenditure, 1912, 1922, and 1932 
cohorts—90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles
Table 13.4  Medicare expenditure by year and cohort (selected years)
Year   p1   p5   p10   p50   p90   p95   p99   Mean
Born in 1912
1997 $0 $0 $37 $1,572 $22,191 $33,641 $63,468 $7,322
2000 $0 $0 $67 $1,704 $21,200 $32,364 $62,752 $7,139
2002 $0 $0 $111 $2,123 $24,555 $37,164 $70,256 $8,267
2005 $0 $0 $154 $2,795 $29,718 $43,950 $79,846 $9,950
Change 2005–1997 $0 $0 $117 $1,223 $7,527 $10,309 $16,378 $2,629
% Annual change 0% 0% 19.5% 7.5% 3.7% 3.4% 2.9% 3.9%
Born in 1922
1997 $0 $0 $0 $825 $15,408 $27,793 $61,918 $5,323
2000 $0 $0 $0 $1,078 $15,150 $27,137 $60,582 $5,397
2002 $0 $0 $11 $1,354 $17,506 $30,997 $68,524 $6,248
2005 $0 $0 $25 $1,797 $21,254 $36,463 $78,402 $7,496
Change 2005–1997 $0 $0 $25 $972 $5,846 $8,670 $16,484 $2,173
% Annual change 0% 0% n.a. 10.2% 4.1% 3.5% 3.0% 4.4%
Born in 1932
1997 $0 $0 $0 $267 $6,484 $16,142 $47,148 $3,009
2000 $0 $0 $0 $354 $6,560 $15,804 $46,510 $3,069
2002 $0 $0 $0 $472 $7,571 $17,952 $52,426 $3,526
2005 $0 $0 $0 $612 $9,488 $21,578 $60,961 $4,237
Change 2005–1997 $0 $0 $0 $346 $3,003 $5,437 $13,813 $1,228
% Annual change   0%   0%   0%   10.9%   4.9%   3.7%   3.3%   4.4%The Narrowing Dispersion of Medicare Expenditures 1997 to 2005    4 0 1
reported by Manton, Gu, and Lamb (2006) that this group has experienced 
a decline in disability prevalence over this period. Disabled individuals are 
substantially more likely than nondisabled individuals to have high Medi-
care expenditures (see Goldman et al. 2005). Similarly, the fact that the 
youngest cohorts have experienced the sharpest increases in per capita Medi-
care expenditures is consistent with the ﬁ  nding reported by Lakdawalla, 
Bhattacharya, and Goldman (2004) that disability rates have been increasing 
over parts of this period in the near- elderly population. As these near- elderly 
individuals age into Medicare, they will naturally raise per capita expendi-
tures for the youngest Medicare enrollees.
One conclusion suggested by the numbers in table 13.2 is that men and 
women had similar increases in per capita Medicare expenditures even if the 
distribution of expenditures for men shifted to the right a bit more than the 
distribution for women. Tables 13.3 and 13.4 show that the latter impression 
is an artifact of the age distribution of men and women in the Medicare 
program. Since men, on average, die at earlier ages than women, the propor-
tion of women in the population who are older than eighty- ﬁ  ve years of age 
is larger than the analogous proportion for men. Of course, we have seen 
that older populations had smaller increases in per capita Medicare expen-
ditures over this period. So comparisons between men and women that are 
unadjusted for age, such as table 13.2, will be biased toward showing greater 
increases in expenditures for men than for women just because Medicare 
men tend to be younger than Medicare women.
Fig. 13.2    Smoothed annual Medicare expenditure, 1912, 1922, and 1932 
cohorts—median and mean402        Jay Bhattacharya, Alan M. Garber, and Thomas MaCurdy
We turn next to a discussion of the role of chronic disease in explain-
ing the changes in the distribution of Medicare expenditures. To set the 
stage for this discussion, we present table 13.5, which shows the prevalence 
of various chronic conditions in subgroups of the Medicare population 
averaged over the whole 1997 to 2005 period. The most common chronic 
conditions in the Medicare population include cataracts (27.95 percent of 
the population), coronary atherosclerosis (20.85 percent), atrial ﬁ  brillation 
(16.69 percent), and diabetes (16.04 percent). The low prevalence of cancer 
survivors in the Medicare population—for example, only 1.9 percent have 
a history of lung/ GI cancer—is explained by the high mortality rate among 
Medicare cancer patients in the year of diagnosis (see Bhattacharya, Garber, 
and Miller 2006).
Table 13.5 also reports changes in the prevalence of chronic disease be-
tween 1997 and 2005. For nearly every chronic condition we examine, 
there was a rise in disease prevalence reﬂ  ecting the aging of the Medicare 
population over this period. The largest prevalence increases relative to the 
1997 baseline were for renal disease (93.4 percent increase over the period), 
osteoporosis (96.4 percent increase), osteoarthritis (57.0 percent increase), 
depression (53.2 percent increase), diabetes (37.6 percent increase), and 
dementia (35.5 percent increase). Several conditions—unstable angina, cat-
aracts, myocardial infarction, stroke, and hip fracture/ dislocation—actually 
declined in frequency over the period. Qualitatively, the pattern of changes 
in disease frequency was similar for men and women.
Chronic disease prevalence increases show no obvious relation to changes 
in the distribution of per capita Medicare expenditures shown on the right 
side of table 13.6. For instance, myocardial infarction (heart attacks), which 
decreased in prevalence over this period, had a sharp $1,350 increase in 
mean expenditures. By contrast, mean expenditures on cataracts, which 
also showed a decrease in prevalence, had a modest $260 increase over the 
period. Conversely, the average expenditures on osteoporosis patients, which 
saw large increase in prevalence, had the lowest increase in mean per capita 
expenditures ($144). For nearly every condition we examine, expenditures 
toward the lower end of the expenditure distribution grew sharply, while 
expenditures toward the upper tails increased less sharply. That no one with 
a chronic condition had zero expenditures is an artifact of the way in which 
the chronic disease indicators are constructed—we inferred the presence of 
a chronic disease from claims ﬁ  les, so a claim (and hence expenditures) were 
required to detect chronic disease.
13.4    Conclusions
After 1997, the growth in expenditures among the highest percentiles 
of users of Medicare-  reimbursed care was less than the rate of growth at 
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 overall dispersion in expenditures fell over time. This trend was diminished, 
at least temporarily, after the implementation of the BBRA. These ﬁ  ndings 
suggest that the main eﬀects of the BBA of 1997 came about as expected. 
Admission to the hospital—even once in a year—is enough to move a ben-
eﬁ  ciary into a relatively high expenditure category. Most of the provisions 
of the BBA that were likely to lead to immediate reductions in expenditures, 
such as the revisions to hospital payments, would have had greatest impact 
on high-  cost beneﬁ  ciaries. Other nonhospital provisions, such as restric-
tions on home health service payments, would also aﬀect primarily high- cost 
users. The provisions that might lead to long-  term expenditure reductions 
for beneﬁ  ciaries who do not use inpatient or outpatient services heavily, such 
as those who are relatively young and do not have chronic diseases, did not 
necessarily have large eﬀects in the near term. For example, a shift to pro-
spective payment for outpatient services might reduce payments for oﬃce 
visits in the long term, but typically a transition to such a payment system 
includes relatively generous payments initially. These changes, of course, 
depend not only on the mechanism of payment but the level of payment.
Changes in expenditures varied by age and other characteristics. A great 
deal of compression in the expenditure distribution occurred at advanced 
ages: cross- sectional analyses reveal that expenditures increased least sharply 
on average for the oldest beneﬁ  ciaries. Though cohort growth rates outpaced 
the cross-  sectional growth in expenditures for every cohort we examined, 
younger cohorts had sharper increases than the oldest cohort. These changes 
reﬂ  ect a variety of inﬂ  uences, an important one being reductions in pay-
ments for home health services, which are disproportionately used by the 
very old. They also reﬂ  ect, to a large degree, changes in disability and disease 
prevalence in the these populations.
Although there are important diﬀerences between expenditures for men 
and women, who have diﬀerent levels of expenditures, the trends in expendi-
ture growth rates were similar for both. By contrast, post-  BBA expenditure 
growth for blacks at the upper percentiles and at the mean of expenditures 
was lower than for whites. Throughout the time period, mean, median, nine-
tieth, and ninety-  ﬁ  fth percentiles of expenditures for blacks were generally 
greater than the levels for whites, which is consistent with the worse health 
of blacks on average.
Although these results cannot be deﬁ  nitively traced to any speciﬁ  c aspects 
of policy, they followed a far- reaching attempt to limit the growth of Medi-
care expenditures. They suggest that expenditure growth was altered most in 
the areas targeted by BBA. They also suggest that piecemeal changes—those 
that target only some components of Medicare—cannot be assumed to 
control overall expenditure growth, since substitution of services can oﬀset 
some of the savings. In the case of the BBA, the appropriate concentration 
on high expenditures is likely to have led to a compression of the expenditure 
distribution, which has implications for all policies that depend upon not 406        Jay Bhattacharya, Alan M. Garber, and Thomas MaCurdy
only the level of expenditures but their variance, a critical consideration in 
expansions of insurance coverage.
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Comment  Jonathan Skinner
A key to solving the problem of runaway growth in the U.S. Medicare pro-
gram’s expenditures (and for health care expenditures more generally) is 
a better understanding of the dynamic process by which health care costs 
continue their march upward. Yet little is known about patterns of growth, 
nor do we know who is actually receiving the additional care. So this study 
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